Product Specification#

Status: Draft, 2026-08-26 (all cited sources accessed 2026-08-26).

Scope note. This is a standardized composite specification assembled for reference liability cash-flow modeling of the French PER individuel assurantiel — the individual plan d’épargne retraite (retirement savings plan) created by the loi PACTE and taken out as membership of a contrat d’assurance de groupe (group life insurance contract). It does not describe any single insurer’s contract. Facts carrying a source tag — [S#] (primary product documents: notices d’information, conditions générales, regulated fee tables) and [R#] (product-specific regulatory and actuarial references), both numbered per _research/per-assurance.md and resolved against sources.md in this directory — were extracted from the cited document. [REG-R#] resolves against the cross-product reference library references/regulatory-and-actuarial-references.md (its own frozen R-numbering). Values marked std are standardizations introduced for the reference implementation; each std table row carries a numbered footnote giving the rationale and, where recorded, the observed range across insurers. Facts not confirmed against a retrieved document are flagged unverified. The mechanics anchors are five retrieved notices / conditions générales [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S7] and the two Cardif documents published under the fee-transparency arrêté [S8] [S9]; the first of these is called the anchor contract below. French terms of art stay French, glossed on first use. The model built from this specification is PER_FR_S, on a monthly grid.

Product overview and market role#

A PER is a savings plan whose object is “l’acquisition et la jouissance de droits viagers personnels ou le versement d’un capital”, payable at the earliest from the liquidation of a compulsory old-age pension or the age of art. L. 161-17-2 of the Code de la sécurité sociale R3 L. 224-1. It comes in two legal forms. The PER bancaire opens a compte-titres (securities account). The PER assurantiel — the subject here — is membership of a group life insurance contract “dont l’exécution est liée à la cessation d’activité professionnelle” R3 L. 224-1 R20 R21; the difference the State itself emphasises is that only the insurance form gives access to a fonds en euros (the capital-guaranteed euro fund) R21.

Every contract in the sample is a group contract with optional individual membership, subscribed by an association acting as souscripteur — GPBF [S1], Le Cercle des Épargnants [S2], AMAP [S3], Association Retraite Falguière or Association PERF [S4] [S5] [S6], SEREP [S7], UFEP [S9] — which charges its own fee: €0,96 per year [S1], €30 at adhesion [S2], €10 [S3] [S4] [S6], €25 [S5], €20 [S8]. Assets are ring-fenced in a comptabilité auxiliaire d’affectation (ring-fenced auxiliary accounting): creditors other than the plan’s policyholders have no claim on them, and under-coverage triggers a recovery plan agreed with the subscribers or imposed by the ACPR R8 L. 142-4 to L. 142-6. The carrier may be a life insurer or a Fonds de Retraite Professionnelle Supplémentaire (FRPS) — Cardif Retraite is an FRPS [S9], the other five sampled carriers are life insurers [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S7]; the prudential consequences of the FRPS regime were not researched unverified.

Three features separate the product from an assurance vie multisupport, and they are what this specification exists to capture. Savings are blocked until the retirement maturity, releasable early only on a closed statutory list R3 L. 224-4. The default management is a glide path: unless the holder expressly decides otherwise, sums follow an allocation that progressively reduces financial risk as the declared liquidation date approaches R3 L. 224-3 R5 D. 224-3 — gestion pilotée par horizon. And the plan carries three compartments keyed to the origin of the money, which decide both the early-release rules and the exit form R3 L. 224-2 R3 L. 224-5.

The market is young and growing fast: 7,9 million insured and €111,9 bn of encours at 31 December 2025, on €20,2 bn of 2025 versements R23 REG-R46; across all providers, 12,7 million holders and €141,1 bn at 30 September 2025, of which PER individuels €82,4 bn R24. For individual PERs written by insurers at 31 December 2024: 4 195 500 plans in force, 91 % in accumulation; contributions €10 496 m, 65 % into unités de compte (UC, unit-linked supports); provisions €70,7 bn, UC 47 % of them; average balance €16 600 in accumulation; benefits €2 837 m, split €93 m death, €1 651 m early releases and transfers, €516 m annuities in payment, €305 m capital exits and €272 m small annuities commuted at outset R22. That split is the shape of the liability: early release and transfer out, not death and not annuity, are the dominant accumulation-phase outflows — about 2,6 % of accumulation-phase provisions leaving every year R22.

This specification standardizes one composite: a compartment-1 PER individuel assurantiel with a euro support and a UC bucket, on the “Équilibré Horizon Retraite” regulatory glide path, with an entry loading, separate euro and UC management charges, an arbitrage charge on the annual rebalancing, a 1 % transfer indemnity in the first five years, a garantie plancher death floor, and an exit split between capital and rente viagère (life annuity).

Representative specification#

Supports#

Parameter

Representative value

Basis

Rights expressed in

Euros and unités de compte

R3 L. 224-3; two-support composite std (4)

Euro-fund capital guarantee

Versements net of entry loading, less management charges levied over the plan’s life, less benefits paid — the [S1] and [S7] drafting, [S7] stating expressly that it is not a floor at gross premiums. [S3] drafts it with euro-fund interest net of charges added, and [S2] as “sommes versées nettes de frais”; the modelled quantity is the [S1] one

[S1] [S7]

Guaranteed technical rate on the euro support

0,00 % gross of charges, for the whole term; no contractual taux minimum garanti, no loyalty clause

R9 A. 142-1 [S1] [S7]

UC guarantee

None; the insurer commits to the number of units, not their value

[S1] [S2]

Euro-fund gross asset return, base scenario

3,38 % p.a.

[S9]; adoption std (5)

UC gross return, base scenario

5,00 % p.a., net of fund-level charges

std (5)

Fund-level charges inside a UC (context, not an input)

equity 1,43 % p.a. (0,94 % retroceded), bond 0,91 % (0,45 %), real estate 2,00 % (0,50 %), diversified 1,17 % (0,57 %)

[S8]

Provision de diversification support

Out of scope — see eurocroissance

[S4] [S6]

  1. Rights may also be expressed in parts de provision de diversification and in unités de rente R3 L. 224-3; both are excluded. The second exclusion matters legally too: L. 224-3’s de-risking paragraphs are switched off for such plans R3 and L. 142-8 sets them a special transfer value R8.

  2. Both return assumptions are standardizations. No public UC return assumption exists for this product [research §18]; 5,00 % is set above the euro asset return so the glide path has something to give up, and is stated net of fund-level charges because those are large relative to the wrapper charge [S8]. The euro figure has a source but not a forward one: [S9] reports a single realised historic number — “Taux de rendement de l’actif du fonds en euros en 2025 : 3,38 %”, one insurer, one year — and carrying it flat over a twelve-year projection is the modelling choice. It is the second-largest financial lever in the model after the glide path, and nothing behind it supports the extrapolation; treat it as a dial, not as an observed forward rate. Neither figure is a projection any insurer publishes.

Gestion pilotée par horizon — the glide path#

Gestion pilotée par horizon is the default management by law R3 L. 224-3, with a right to opt out of the minimum de-risking pace on express request R5 D. 224-3. D. 224-3 delegates the rythme minimal de sécurisation and the definition of low-risk assets to a ministerial arrêté R5; that arrêté fixes four qualified profiles and, for each, a minimum share of the plan balance in low-risk assets by distance to the declared liquidation date R6 art. 1 part (a):

Profile

more than 10 years out

10 to 5 years out

5 to 2 years out

under 2 years out

Prudent horizon retraite

30 %

60 %

80 %

90 %

Équilibré horizon retraite

—

20 %

50 %

70 %

Dynamique horizon retraite

—

—

30 %

50 %

Offensif horizon retraite

—

—

30 %

50 %

Suravenir reproduces this grid verbatim as its own product specification [S7] and Generali’s three profiles hit exactly these percentages over exactly these bands [S2]. In this market the regulatory grid is not a floor insurers beat; it is the product. Insurers may sit above it, and the anchor contract does, on 20 one-year bands rather than four: its Équilibré ladder holds 20 / 22 / 25 / 50 / 70 / 80 % in the euro support as the horizon closes, against 30 / 45 / 60 / 80 / 95 / 100 % for Prudent [S1].

A second minimum bites since 24 October 2024: a minimum share of versements routed to unlisted eligible vehicles (ELTIFs, alternative investment funds, commercial-company securities managed by portfolio management companies, sustainable collective vehicles), at 20, 15, 10 and 5 years out — prudent 6 / 4 / 2 / — %, équilibré 8 / 6 / 5 / 3 %, dynamique 12 / 10 / 7 / 5 %, offensif 15 / 12 / 9 / 6 % — thresholds cut by 30 % for company plans, compliance by 31 December 2026 R6 part (b) R7. The anchor contract implements it with a private-equity line at 6 / 4 / 2 / 0 % on its prudent profile [S1]; MACSF states its three profiles comply [S3]. The reference model does not carve the unlisted bucket out of the UC bucket, and this is the one regulatory requirement it declines to implement, so the reason belongs here rather than in a footnote. Part (b) is a minimum on the versements routed to eligible vehicles, not on the plan balance, so it does not compose with the part (a) balance grid the model runs on; no retrieved document gives those vehicles a return, a charge or a liquidity basis of their own, so a third support would carry nothing but std assumptions; and on the base scenario it would change no cash flow, because the model already values the whole UC bucket at one return. Modelling it means adding a third support with its own return and its own charge, and re-cutting the glide path on a contribution base rather than a balance base. model.md records the same exclusion.

Parameter

Representative value

Basis

Profile modelled

Équilibré horizon retraite (the market default)

[S1] [S2] [S4] [S7]; adoption std (6)

Glide-path grid

The regulatory minimum grid above: euro share 0 % / 20 % / 50 % / 70 %

R6 [S2] [S7]

Band-edge convention

The tighter minimum applies at a boundary: k > 10 → 0 %, 10 ≥ k > 5 → 20 %, 5 ≥ k > 2 → 50 %, k ≤ 2 → 70 %, with k the years to the declared horizon

std (7)

“Low risk” realised as

The euro support in full

std (7)

Rebalancing

Annual, in the month that starts the plan year, on both the new versement and the existing balance

frequency std (8); scope [S1]

Frais d’arbitrage on the rebalancing

0,30 % of the amount switched

[S1]; adoption std (9)

Holder arbitrage under a horizon profile

Not permitted

[S1] [S2] [S4]

Change of declared retirement date

Immediate re-allocation of the whole balance

[S3] [S4]

Insurer’s right to restate a profile

May unilaterally change a profile’s allocation to keep the regulatory de-risking

[S3] [S4]

  1. The sample’s default profile is “Équilibré Horizon Retraite” [S1] [S4] [S7], Generali selling under “Gestion Horizon Retraite” on the “Équilibré” reference [S2]. No public data exists on the mix of profiles actually chosen [research §18].

  2. Two conventions are needed and no retrieved text settles either. (i) R6’s part (a) grid was extracted, percentages and band headings both [research §5], and it is the table reproduced above. What it does not settle is which side of a boundary year each band takes: the headings as rendered read “≥ 10 years out” and “from 10 years out”, which overlap at k = 10, and the same at 5 and at 2. Assigning the boundary year to the tighter band is therefore the model’s own convention std, not a reading of the text. (Research caveat 12, which flags “jusqu’à N ans” as unverified, is about R6’s part (b) unlisted-asset table, not this one.) (ii) The definition of actifs présentant un profil d’investissement à faible risque is delegated to an arrêté that was not retrieved R5 D. 224-3, and the two contract definitions found disagree — SRRI ≤ 3 [S7] against ≤ 2 including the euro fund [S3]. Realising the low-risk bucket wholly as the euro support is the most conservative reading of both and keeps the model to two supports.

  3. Observed frequencies: semi-annual in Q2 and Q4 [S1]; semi-annual [S2]; semi-annual on 15 March and 15 September [S3]; threshold-driven and at least semi-annual [S4]; quarterly [S7]. Annual is the coarsest, and on the monthly projection grid it is no longer forced — it is chosen. The reference model keeps it because the de-risking grid is keyed by whole years to the horizon, so a sub-annual rebalancing re-imposes the same target inside the year: it corrects drift rather than de-risking faster, and turning it on is an assumption change rather than a finer grid. It still understates the glide path’s tracking accuracy and overstates each switch, and the cost is now measurable rather than merely arguable — on the anchor cell, quarterly rebalancing changes the final balance by −0,0142 % and the twelve-year arbitrage charge from 95,75 to 96,21; on the 32-year model point 12, by −0,0343 %.

  4. Horizon arbitrage is free at [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7]; the anchor contract charges 0,30 % of amounts switched [S1] and Cardif 1 % with no free arbitrages [S8]. The non-nil rate makes the cost of the glide path a visible line; zero reproduces the majority contract.

Charges#

Every figure below is a maximum stated in a notice or in a regulated fee table.

Charge

Representative value

Basis

Frais sur versement (entry loading)

2,50 % of each versement

[S8] [S10]; adoption std (10)

Euro-support management charge

0,70 % p.a.

[S8] [S9]; adoption std (11)

UC management charge

0,70 % p.a.

[S8] [S9]; adoption std (11)

Gestion pilotée par horizon surcharge

None — inside the 0,70 %

[S8]

Frais d’arbitrage

0,30 % of the amount switched

[S1]; adoption std (9)

Charge basis and timing

Levied on the end-of-year balance, after crediting

std (12)

Outgoing transfer indemnity

1 % of acquired rights before the fifth anniversary of the first versement, nil thereafter

R3 L. 224-6 [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7] [S8]

Additional transfer-value reduction

Up to 15 % of the value of rights expressed in euros where the transfer right exceeds the asset share backing it; a switch, off in the base

R5 R. 224-6 R3 L. 224-6 [S8]; base setting std (12)

Capital exit charge

0 %

[S1] [S2] [S3] [S7] [S8]

Early-release (déblocage anticipé) charge

0 %

[S2] [S3] [S7]

Frais d’arrérages on annuity instalments

1,50 % of each gross instalment

[S8]; adoption std (13)

Annuity-phase management charge

0,80 % p.a. of annuity reserves — cross-referenced, not modelled here

[S7]

  1. Observed entry loadings span the market: 0 % [S4] [S7]; 2,50 % [S8] [S10]; 3 % (2,5 % under a convention d’abonnement) [S3]; 3,50 % [S6]; 4 % [S1]; 4,50 % [S2]; 4,80 %, on incoming transfers too [S5]. 2,50 % is the figure in the only current-regime documents publishing one under the fee-transparency arrêté R16 [S8].

  2. Observed AUM charges: euro 0,50 % [S3] to 2,30 % [S5] [S6]; UC 0,50 % [S3] [S4] to 1,10 % [S2]. The pair 0,70 % / 0,70 % is Cardif’s regulated grid [S8], adopted also as the only sampled figure with a matching gross-charge-net triple on the same euro fund [S9] — crediting and charge assumptions from one document.

  3. Charge timing differs and is load-bearing: end-of-month balance, monthly [S1]; quarterly on UC, annually on the euro fund at value date 31 December pro rata temporis [S2]; annually at 31 December on both [S3]; accrued daily, levied annually on the euro fund and monthly on UC [S7]. The monthly projection grid can now carry more than one of them, and the reference model deliberately keeps the [S3] convention — the charge levied whole at the plan-year end on the post-crediting balance — because that is what keeps the garantie plancher base exact. The base accumulates a sum of charges rather than a product of factors, so twelve monthly charges do not add to the annual one: measured, a monthly levy leaves the account value at every anniversary unchanged but moves the base by up to €71,95 on the anchor cell and €531,57 on model point 12. [S1]’s monthly levy on an end-of-month balance is the documented variant and is a new assumption rather than a finer grid. The price of the convention is that a mid-year exit is valued gross of the plan year’s charge, 0,387 % above the anniversary value in the anchor cell’s last plan year. The 15 % transfer-value reduction is nil in the base for a different reason — it is a management action conditional on a market state the base scenario does not produce, and in a rising-rate scenario it dominates the 1 % fee by an order of magnitude [S3] [S8].

  4. Observed frais d’arrérages: 0 % [S2] [S5] [S7]; 0,50 % capped at 1 % of the monthly social security ceiling per instalment [S4]; 0,50 % [S6]; 1 % [S1]; 1,50 % [S8]; 3 % [S3]. 1,50 % is the current-regime regulated figure [S8]; charged on every instalment for life, it moves the capital at which the commutation test bites.

Euro-fund crediting and participation aux bénéfices#

Parameter

Representative value

Basis

Maximum technical interest rate for a PER

0 %

R9 A. 142-1

Guaranteed accumulation rate

0,00 % — the euro support has a capital floor plus profit sharing, not a guaranteed rate

[S1] [S7] R9

Statutory profit-sharing frame

Minimum PB computed globally from a compte de participation aux résultats; the provision pour participation aux bénéfices (PPB) is the smoothing device

REG-R14 REG-R15 REG-R16 [S1]

PPB release horizon

Eight years generally; fifteen for commitments under a comptabilité auxiliaire d’affectation per L. 142-4 — which is what a PER is

REG-R16 R8 L. 142-4

Contractual PB clause

Present at the anchor contract [S1]; absent at [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7]; Generali instead announces an annual taux minimum garanti [S2] REG-R18

[S1] [S2] [S4] [S7]

Crediting frequency

Annual, at 31 December

[S3] [S7]; adoption std (14)

Observed gross-charge-net triple

euro-fund asset return 3,38 % in 2025, management charge 0,70 %, net rate served 2,75 %

[S9]

UC income treatment

100 % of coupons and dividends reinvested (90 % on SCPI units at one contract)

[S1] [S4] [S6]; exception [S5]

  1. Observed crediting: weekly, at a rate from a quarterly prospective PB assessment, definitively acquired each Friday [S1]; daily compounding with the annual PB at value date 31 December [S2]; annual at 31 December [S3]; annual with partial exits revalued pro rata temporis at the served rate [S7]. The reference model credits both supports at (1 + r)^(1/12) − 1 a month, so twelve months compound back to the published annual rate exactly and no anniversary balance moves. That is the monthly realisation of the one thing every sampled contract agrees on for a mid-year exit: [S7]’s pro rata temporis revaluation at the served rate, [S1]’s weekly crediting definitively acquired each Friday, and [S2]’s daily compounding. Crediting the whole year at the anniversary instead would pay every mid-year death, release and transfer on a balance carrying no return since the last one.

Note what the [S9] triple says: 3,38 % gross less a 0,70 % charge is 2,68 %, yet the rate served was 2,75 % — the extra seven basis points came from somewhere other than the year’s asset return, which is what a PPB is for REG-R15 REG-R16. The reference model credits the euro support at the asset return, takes the charge on the post-crediting balance and does not model a PPB stock.

Death benefit during accumulation#

Parameter

Representative value

Basis

Effect of death before maturity

The plan closes

R3 L. 224-4 II R21

Contractual benefit

The accumulated savings at the date death is notified, euro part revalued to that date

[S3]

Garantie plancher (death floor)

Not less than versements net of entry loading, less management charges levied over the plan’s life, less benefits already paid

[S1]

Cessation

The member’s 70th birthday

[S1] [S3]

Cap

€762 245 across all contracts [S3]; pro-rating above €800 000 of aggregate net premiums [S1]

[S1] [S3]

Charge for it

0,10 % p.a. on UC balances [S3]; 0,12 % p.a. inside the 1 % management charge [S1] — modelled as included in the 0,70 %

inclusion std (15)

Optional death cover (variation)

Reimburses the capital sous risque; ages 12 to under 70 at adhesion, one-year waiting period, no medical underwriting, cap €100 000, ends at 75; premium 0,15 ‰ to 5,15 ‰ per month of capital at risk by age

[S7]

Suicide exclusion

First year

[S1] [S7]

  1. Neither published garantie plancher charge is separable from its own contract’s AUM charge in a way that transfers to a 0,70 % composite, and folding it in keeps one charge dial per support. It is revisable by agreement between subscriber and insurer on demographic grounds in both contracts [S1] [S3], so it is not a contractual constant in any case.

Two draftings of the floor, and this table states one of them. [S1] guarantees a death benefit “not less than premiums net of charges minus benefits already paid” — no interest limb, and [S7] says expressly of its own euro guarantee that it is not a floor at gross premiums. [S3] drafts the same guarantee the other way: the settled amount “cannot be less than contributions net of loading plus euro-fund interest net of management charges”. The representative value above is [S1]’s, because that is what the reference model computes; technical-notes.md is the source of truth for the recursion and states the same thing. The choice is load-bearing rather than stylistic: on [S1]’s drafting the gap between the account value and the floor is exactly the cumulative gross investment return, so the floor bites only after a loss, and the model asserts that identity; on [S3]’s the euro leg of that return accrues to the floor too, and on an all-euro plan the floor would track the account value. [S3] remains the source for the €762 245 cap and, with [S1], for the cessation at 70 — the Cessation and Cap rows above.

Exit at retirement#

Parameter

Representative value

Basis

Maturity trigger

The earliest of pension liquidation and the L. 161-17-2 age

R3 L. 224-1

Exit menu, C1 and C2

Capital “libéré en une fois ou de manière fractionnée”, or a rente viagère, or a mix — unless the holder has irrevocably opted for the annuity beforehand

R3 L. 224-5 R20 R21

Exit menu, C3

Life annuity only

R3 L. 224-5 [S2]

Anchor exit split

70 % capital in one payment, 30 % converted to a rente viagère

std (16)

Partial capital exit minima (anchor contract)

€750 per instalment, residual ≥ €750 with ≥ €150 per support, paid within ten working days

[S1]

Annuity technical interest rate

0 %

R9 A. 142-1 [S2] [S3] [S7]

Annuity mortality basis

Homologated generational TGF05 (female) / TGH05 (male), or the insurer’s own certified experience table, which may never produce a cheaper annuity

R11 A. 335-1 R12 REG-R21 REG-R23

Table vintage

In force at annuity commencement [S2] [S4] [S7]; the anchor contract freezes the table in force at adhesion for deductible C1 sums and adhesion-date incoming transfers [S1]

[S1] [S2] [S4] [S7]

Annuity factor, anchor cell

22,0000 per €1 p.a. — male aged 64, annual in arrears, no reversion, 0 % technical rate

std (17)

Payment frequency

Quarterly in arrears [S1] [S2]; monthly in arrears [S7]; anchor annual in arrears

std (17)

Small-annuity commutation threshold

Monthly quittance d’arrérages not exceeding €110 including statutory increases, multiplied by the number of months in the payment period; requires the annuitant’s agreement

R10 A. 160-2

Take-up in practice, 2024

Of €1 093 m paid on individual PERs in payment: €516 m annuities, €305 m capital exits, €272 m small annuities commuted at outset; averages €1 300 p.a. annuity, €12 500 capital exit, €16 200 commuted

R22

  1. No public data exists on the annuity/capital election [research §18]. The 2024 payment-phase split by amount was 47 % annuity, 28 % capital, 25 % commuted small annuity R22 — but the third is an annuity election that reverses at settlement, so it is not an election rate. 70/30 puts the anchor annuity below the commutation threshold, exercising the reversal.

  2. No sampled insurer publishes an annuity rate card. The contracts say only “la table de mortalité en vigueur” and “le taux d’intérêt technique en vigueur” [S1] [S2] [S4] [S7], and the TGF05 / TGH05 rate tables, annexed to a public arrêté R12, were not extracted and are not shipped REG-R21. At a 0 % technical rate the factor collapses to the tariff table’s expected number of instalments, so 22,0000 asserts 22 further annual payments to a male aged 64 — a placeholder, to be replaced by a TGH05 computation before any quantitative use. Annual payment in arrears is fixed by annuity_factor.csv, which holds an undiscounted count of annual instalments — not by the projection grid, which is monthly: paying quarterly or monthly means replacing that table, not changing a step. The model applies the commutation test on the monthly equivalent for exactly that reason.

Anchor model cell#

Attribute

Value

Basis

Sex / attained age at the valuation date

M / 52

std (18)

Declared retirement age

64 → 12 years to horizon

std (2)

Completed years since the first versement

2

std (18)

Compartment / profile

C1 / équilibré horizon retraite

(1), (6)

Opening balance

€16 600, entirely in UC

R22; all-UC std (18)

Opening garantie plancher base

€16 000

std (18)

Annual versement

€3 000, at the start of each plan year to the horizon

std (19)

Exit

70 % capital in one payment, 30 % to a rente viagère

(16)

Deduction elected at entry

Yes — recorded, and inert in the cash flows

R13 R18 R20; see Regulatory context

  1. Modeling anchors. €16 600 is the published average accumulation-phase balance on an individual PER at 31 December 2024 R22; a two-year-old plan holding it implies an incoming transfer at adhesion, the common case — 0,2 million of the 1,2 million new insured in 2024 arrived by transfer, carrying €4,2 bn R22. Holding it all in UC is consistent with the équilibré grid, whose euro minimum is nil at 12 years out R6, and makes the first band crossing visible. The €16 000 opening floor sits €600 below the balance; that gap is the accumulated investment return to date.

  2. Implied average annual contribution per individual PER: €10 496 m over 4 195 500 plans ≈ €2 502 in 2024 R22; €20,2 bn over 7,9 million insured ≈ €2 557 in 2025 R23.

Contractual mechanics#

Blocage. Savings are blocked until the earliest of pension liquidation and the L. 161-17-2 age R3 L. 224-1, and the contracts describe the accumulation phase as having no surrender right except in the statutory cases [S2] [S3] [S4] [S7]. This is not a surrender charge, not a market value adjustment and not a penalty: the right does not exist. A model of this product that carries a lapse decrement has mis-stated the contract.

The cases of déblocage anticipé. The statutory list, as consolidated at 14 June 2026, is seven items R3 L. 224-4 I: (1) death of the spouse or PACS partner; (2) invalidity of the holder, a child, the spouse or PACS partner, within the 2° and 3° of art. L. 341-4 of the Code de la sécurité sociale; (2 bis) serious illness, disability or a particularly grave accident affecting a dependent child; (3) over-indebtedness within art. L. 711-1 of the Code de la consommation; (4) expiry of unemployment insurance rights, or a former director or board member without an employment contract or corporate office for at least two years; (5) cessation of self-employment following a judicial liquidation, or a situation justified by the president of the commercial court in a conciliation; (6) use of the savings to acquire the main residence, from which rights arising from compulsory contributions (C3) are excluded; (7) the holder is under 18 at the date of the request. The classic “six cas de déblocage anticipé” formulation is out of date — economie.gouv.fr still says six R21, service-public.fr lists the extra cases R20, and the anchor contract’s June 2026 notice reproduces all seven [S1]. The commencement date and amending instrument for 2° bis and 7° were not identified unverified. Release is paid as a single payment of all or part of the eligible rights, at the holder’s choice R5 D. 224-4; the anchor contract requires the event to fall between adhesion and the planned retirement age, sets a €750 minimum on a partial release with a €750 residual and €150 per support, and pays within ten working days [S1]. Three contracts levy no charge [S2] [S3] [S7].

Death before maturity closes the plan R3 L. 224-4 II R21; the insurance form pays the accumulated savings to the named beneficiaries under the life insurance rules R20 R21, floored by the garantie plancher where granted [S1] [S3].

The glide path as an operative rule. At each rebalancing date the target low-risk share is read off the profile’s grid against the years remaining to the declared liquidation date, and both the incoming versement and the existing balance are allocated to that target R6 [S1]. Three consequences a projection must respect: the target is a minimum, not an allocation [S1]; changing the declared retirement date triggers an immediate re-allocation of the whole balance [S3] [S4]; and the insurer may restate a profile’s allocation unilaterally [S3] [S4], so a published grid is a snapshot.

Transfer out. Rights under accumulation are transferable to any other PER, and the transfer does not alter the surrender or liquidation conditions R3 L. 224-6. The fee “ne peuvent excéder 1 % des droits acquis” and is nil after five years from the first versement in the plan, or where the transfer occurs from the L. 224-1 maturity R3 L. 224-6; every sampled contract reproduces the rule [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7] [S8], and MACSF adds that it is nil once the member has liquidated a compulsory pension or reached the L. 161-17-2 age [S3]. Separately, where the transfer value of the mathematical provisions exceeds the asset share representing them, the plan may reduce that value, “sans que cette réduction puisse toutefois excéder 15 % de la valeur des droits individuels du titulaire relatifs à des engagements exprimés en euros” R5 R. 224-6 [S8]. Settlement runs from 10 working days [S1] to 2 months [S4] [S6]. A different rule governs transfers in from legacy products (PERP, Madelin, PERCO, article 83, PREFON, COREM, CRH): 1 % of acquired rights, nil after ten years from the first contribution R5 D. 224-18 R4 L. 224-40.

Exit at maturity. The irrevocable annuity election may be made at adhesion or later and the insurer must warn of its character in writing R3 L. 224-5 [S1] [S2] [S4]; once a fractional capital settlement has begun one contract accepts no further contributions [S3]; and from five years before retirement the manager must answer questions on rights and exit options, with six months’ advance notification R4 L. 224-30.

Annuity conversion and commutation. The annuity depends on the accumulated value net of social and tax levies, the dates of birth, the mortality table in force, the option chosen, the frequency, the annuités garanties, the technical rate in force and the service charge; the insurer does not guarantee the amount, and annuities in payment are revalued through the profit-sharing account [S1] [S4] [S7]. Because the technical rate is capped at 0 % R9 A. 142-1, the conversion factor is an undiscounted expected-instalment count — with consequences set out in the technical notes. The insurer may substitute a single capital payment, with the annuitant’s agreement, where the monthly quittance d’arrérages does not exceed €110 including statutory increases, scaled by the number of months in the payment period R10 A. 160-2; contracts still quote the superseded PER-specific €240 per quarter [S2] and €80 per month [S4], from the €100 and €80 vintages of the abrogated art. A. 160-2-1 R10. The mechanism is not marginal — €272 m of 2024 individual-PER benefits at an average €16 200 per case R22, and with the average annuity in payment at €1 300 p.a., about €108 per month, the average PER annuity sits just under the threshold R22 R10. Every contract also publishes a minimum transfer-value table for the first eight years on maximum charges [S1] [S2] [S3] [S4] [S7] — the natural external validation target for a projection model.

Riders and options#

In scope (modelled as flags):

  • Garantie plancher — a death floor at versements net of charges less benefits paid, included rather than optional in two contracts, ceasing at the 70th birthday, capped at €762 245 across contracts [S3] or pro-rated above €800 000 of aggregate net premiums [S1]. Modelled with the cover inside the management charge; footnote (15).

  • Annuity reversion, statutorily required to be offered R3 L. 224-1 — observed 50 %–200 % in 10 % steps [S2], 50 %–150 % narrowing to 50 %–100 % with guaranteed annuities [S4], 1 %–100 % [S7], the beneficiary fixed definitively at set-up [S1] — and annuités garanties, bounded by art. A. 335-1 at life expectancy at the annuity effective date minus five years [S2] [S4], narrowed by one contract to 5 to 25 years in 5-year steps [S7].

  • Exit form and split — capital in one payment, fractional capital, annuity or a mix R3 L. 224-5; carried as model point columns.

Out of scope for the composite, and why:

  • Optional death cover on the capital sous risque [S7] — the only published mortality rate card in the sample. It is a gross premium scale on a no-underwriting cover, not a mortality assumption, and must not be read as one.

  • Rente par paliers (2 or 3 steps, intermediate steps ≤ 10 years, variation limited to −50 % and +100 % [S2] [S4] [S7]), reversion recomputation where the surviving spouse at death is not the one who held that status at liquidation [S7], and the rente temporaire d’éducation to minor children to their 25th birthday [S2] — option costs no sampled tariff quantifies. Sécurisation des plus-values (0,50 % of the amount moved) and loss-limitation options (0,20 % p.a.) exist only outside a horizon profile [S2].

  • Garanties complémentaires — death, disability income, loss of autonomy, unemployment and a value guarantee, with the loss-of-autonomy benefit capped at twice the rights otherwise acquired. Both the permission and the cap are R8 L. 142-3; R9 A. 142-2 to A. 142-4 carry the loss-of-autonomy cover’s operating conditions instead — benefit reduction limits, medical underwriting and annual revaluation (A. 142-2), presentation in a separate chapter of the policy with its own premium (A. 142-3), and annual disclosure of the revalued benefit and the premium paid for it (A. 142-4). Chasing the cap to R9 finds nothing, which is why the two are split here.

  • Provision de diversification supports with an 80 % capital guarantee at maturity, 1 % p.a. plus up to 10 % of positive performance [S4] [S6], which are the eurocroissance product.

Variations across insurers#

  1. The dominant variation is the distributor, not the insurer. Spirica writes [S4], [S5] and [S6] under one licence, with the same Fonds Euro PER Nouvelle Génération, the same three horizon profiles and the same annuity options — yet the entry loading runs 0 % / 4,80 % / 3,50 %, the euro charge 2,00 % / 2,30 % / 2,30 %, the UC charge 0,50 % / 1,00 % / 1,00 % and the arrérage charge 0,50 % / 0 % / 0,50 %. Any statement of the form “insurer X charges Y on a PER” is meaningless here; the contract, not the carrier, is the unit of analysis.

  2. The mechanics, by contrast, are close to uniform, because the statute fixes them: three compartments R3 L. 224-2, seven early-release cases R3 L. 224-4, one exit menu R3 L. 224-5, the 1 % / five-year transfer cap R3 L. 224-6, a 0 % maximum technical rate R9 A. 142-1 and a de-risking grid most insurers adopt at its regulatory minimum R6 [S2] [S7]. A reference implementation can model one PER assurantiel and treat the charge basis as a parameter set.

  3. Glide-path granularity and cost. Twenty one-year bands [S1] against the four regulatory bands [S2] [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7] [S8], with one contract driving the ladder off the member’s age in a financial annex [S3]; rebalancing quarterly [S7], semi-annually on fixed dates [S1] [S3] or threshold-driven [S4] [S5]; arbitrage free [S2] [S3] [S4] [S5] [S7] against 0,30 % [S1] and 1 % [S8]. Chosen: the four regulatory bands, annual rebalancing, 0,30 %.

  4. Euro-fund crediting, profit sharing and death floor. Crediting weekly [S1], daily-compounded with the PB at value date 31 December [S2], or annual [S3] [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7]; a contractual PB clause [S1], an announced annual taux minimum garanti [S2] REG-R18, or none at all [S4] [S5] [S6] [S7]; a death floor included as standard to 70 [S1] [S3], optional [S4] [S5] [S6], an age-rated rider [S7] or unstated [S2] [S8]. Chosen: annual crediting, no contractual PB clause, floor included to 70 with the €762 245 cap.

  5. Annuity basis and charge. Table vintage frozen at adhesion for deductible C1 sums and adhesion-date incoming transfers [S1] against current at liquidation elsewhere [S2] [S3] [S4] [S7]; payment quarterly in arrears at 1 % [S1], quarterly at 0 % [S2], monthly at 0 % [S7], 3 % per gross instalment [S3], 1,5 % [S8]. Chosen: current at liquidation, annual in arrears at 1,50 %. A model that assumes a single conversion basis will misprice the [S1]-style frozen-table guarantee, a long-dated option the contract gives away.

Regulatory context#

Constitutive law. Art. 71 of the loi PACTE created the PER as a new Chapitre IV of the Code monétaire et financier R1, and the ordonnance n° 2019-766 du 24 juillet 2019 replaced the PERP, Madelin, PERCO and article 83 contracts with one collective, one category and one individual plan, marketable from 1 October 2019, with transfer rights from the legacy products R2 R4 L. 224-40; the two liberalisations that report identifies are early release for the main residence and free choice between annuity and capital outside compulsory contributions R2. Common rules sit at L. 224-1 to L. 224-8 R3 REG-R34, individual-plan rules at L. 224-28 to L. 224-39 R4, the regulatory layer at R. 224-1 to D. 224-18 R5.

Insurance law. The insurance-form chapter is L. 142-1 to L. 142-8 of the Code des assurances R8: tariffs from mortality parameters and a contractual technical rate whose maximum is fixed by arrêté R8 L. 142-2; enumerated and bounded garanties complémentaires R8 L. 142-3; a mandatory ring-fenced comptabilité auxiliaire d’affectation, with legacy commitments moved into it by 1 January 2023 R8 L. 142-4, a policyholder priority claim R8 L. 142-5 and an ACPR-supervised recovery mechanism on under-coverage R8 L. 142-6. The maximum technical rate is 0 % — “Les tarifs pratiqués par les entreprises d’assurance au titre des plans d’épargne retraite sont établis d’après un taux d’intérêt technique au plus égal à 0 %” R9 A. 142-1 — which displaces the general 75 %/60 %-of-TME ceiling REG-R17 for this product. Mortality bases follow art. A. 335-1: homologated tables by sex, or the undertaking’s own experience tables certified by an independent actuary, with an explicit floor that an experience-table annuity tariff may never be cheaper than the homologated one R11 REG-R23. The homologated annuity tables are the generational TGF05 and TGH05 R12 REG-R21; the non-annuity TH 00-02 / TF 00-02 govern the death benefit during accumulation REG-R22 REG-R23. No rate table is shipped with this library; the decrement CSVs are std proxies built from INSEE population data REG-R24.

Conduct, information and macroprudential. The duty of advice at sale covers the prospect’s situation, financial knowledge, horizon, return expectations, objectives including sustainability preferences and retirement needs, plus the plan’s characteristics, management methods, availability conditions and tax treatment R4 L. 224-29 REG-R12. The general life regime applies on top — the note d’information and the one-page encadré with its four-category fee disclosure REG-R30, the thirty-day renonciation window REG-R29, the annual statement and website publication duties REG-R31, and for the UC the PRIIPs and AMF collective-vehicle layer REG-R33. Note what the encadré does not do: it requires maxima to be disclosed, not levels to be capped REG-R30 — which is why every charge level here is a maximum and every adopted level is std. Separately, the Haut Conseil de stabilité financière may temporarily limit surrender payments and defer or restrict arbitrages REG-R13; the PER’s blocage removes the surrender channel, so on this product the power would reach the early-release and transfer legs and the glide-path arbitrages — this document’s reading, not a statement in the article.

Taxation — and why it stays out of the projection. C1 versements are deductible from revenu net global under CGI art. 163 quatervicies, within a ceiling equal to the greater of 10 % of the prior year’s professional income capped at 8 PASS and 10 % of the PASS, less professional retirement contributions already deducted or exempted R13 R17 REG-R42; published figures are a €4 710 minimum and a €37 680 maximum, the ceiling reduced by employer contributions to a PERCO/PERECO/PERO within a €7 419 exempt limit R18 R20. Those figures mix PASS vintages, so a model must parameterise the PASS rather than hard-code either [research caveat 7], and the carry-forward is three years or five depending on vintage — a conflict the official sources leave standing, hence unverified R13 R17 R18 R20 R21 REG-R42. From 1 January 2026 contributions after the holder’s 70th birthday are no longer deductible R20 R21. The holder may decline the deduction, and that election is the pivot of the whole exit tax treatment R19 R20 R21 [S7]: where contributions were deducted, a capital exit is taxed on the contribution part at the progressive scale with no social levies and on the gains at the flat rate, and an annuity as a pension after the 10 % abatement; where they were not, the contribution part is exempt from both and the annuity is a rente viagère à titre onéreux taxed on an age-graded fraction — 70 % under 50, 50 % at 50–59, 40 % at 60–69, 30 % at 70 and over R20 R21 [S7]. Social levies move from 17,2 % to 18,6 % from 1 January 2026, taking the flat levy on gains from 30 % to 31,4 %; the enacting instrument was not retrieved and the rates are unverified R20 R21. Capital from a PERIN is reported on lines 1AI–1DI at ordinary income-tax rates, without the 7,5 % flat option or the quotient available for PERP capital R19. None of this changes the liability cash flows this model projects. The election alters what the holder keeps, not what the insurer pays; the gross benefit is the same euro amount either way. The model projects gross-of-tax amounts and carries deduction_elected on the model point purely so a downstream tax layer can find it.

Death taxation, and the age-70 cliff. Death before 70 falls under CGI art. 990 I: €152 500 abatement per beneficiary, then 20 % up to €700 000 and 31,25 % above R14 REG-R41. Death after 70 falls under art. 757 B, and the PER carve-out is explicit: sums “dues … à raison du décès après l’âge de soixante-dix ans du titulaire d’un plan d’épargne retraite” enter the inheritance-duty base in their entirety, not merely as to premiums paid after 70, subject to a €30 500 global abatement across all contracts on the same life R15 REG-R41. The trigger is the age at death, not the age at which each premium was paid — the opposite of ordinary assurance vie. Crossing 70 alive is a cliff edge in a PER assurantiel, and it coincides with the age at which the garantie plancher stops [S1] [S3] and, from 2026, with the age at which contributions stop being deductible R21.

Prudential — cited, not specified. PER commitments sit in a ring-fenced comptabilité auxiliaire d’affectation under ACPR supervision R8 REG-R10. Of the eleven statutory technical provisions of art. R. 343-3, the provision mathématique, the provision pour participation aux bénéfices and the provision pour risque d’exigibilité reach this product REG-R6 REG-R7, and the provision pour aléas financiers mechanics remain live even though the article carrying them was abrogated in 2016 REG-R8. Solvency II technical provisions, SCR and risk margin REG-R1 REG-R2 REG-R5 were not researched for this product unverified.